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Punishments in Penal Institutions:
(Dis)-Proportionality in Isolation
By Jacob Zoghlin*

U

Introduction

nited Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E.
Méndez, reports that on any given day in the United
States, prisons hold more than 80,000 people in solitary confinement for a wide variety of offenses. Twenty-five
thousand of those individuals are being held in “Super-max”
prisons, facilities created for long-term solitary confinement.1
In California’s Pelican Bay State Prison, for example, some
prisoners have been held in isolation for over twenty years. In
July 2013, an estimated 29,000 prisoners organized a hunger
strike throughout California to protest the State’s use of solitary confinement.2 The widespread use of solitary confinement
is particularly troublesome in light of the lack of standards
for when punitive solitary confinement may be used, whom
it may be used against, and the duration for which it may be
used. Moreover, medical experts have confirmed concerns that
the overuse of punitive solitary confinement can cause severe
physical and psychological harm.3 In light of these problems,
which largely stem from the lack of rules regulating solitary
confinement, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) has urged U.S. authorities “to restrict the use
of solitary confinement of prisoners in accordance with international human rights standards.”4

Solitary Confinement, photo courtesy of Flikr user Jodi Wilson

Exploring Solitary Confinement –
A Story From the Box
The Istanbul Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary
Confinement defines solitary confinement as the physical isolation of individuals who are confined to their cells for twenty-two
to twenty-four hours per day.5 Although prisons refer to solitary
confinement facilities as “Super-max,” “Secure Housing Unit
(SHU),” or “Special Housing Unit,” prisoners know them as “the
hole” or “the box.”6 People in solitary confinement are usually
housed in tiny cells and have limited contact with other people.
This extreme social isolation is made more severe by intellectual
and spiritual deprivation that prisoners face – prisoners in solitary confinement are subject to rigid restrictions on recreation,
visitation, reading, religious practice, and other privileges that
may be available to the general prison population. Accordingly,
the near-total absence of external stimuli leaves prisoners with
few options other than to retreat into their own thoughts, which
often leads to extreme physiological changes, psychological
deterioration, and often lasting physical and emotional harm.7

This article addresses whether the lack of standards associated with the use of punitive solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the U.S.
Constitution. It begins by discussing the nature, purpose, and
effect of solitary confinement. The article then evaluates the use
of solitary confinement under both U.S. law and international
human rights standards. It argues that the absence of adequate
regulation and oversight of solitary confinement risks arbitrary
and excessive use and results in punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the underlying offense in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Finally, this article concludes that stricter
standards prohibiting punitive solitary confinement – or at least
limiting its use to certain enumerated, violent violations – would
prevent solitary confinement from being used as a disciplinary
measure of first resort and would help alleviate some of its constitutional infirmities.

Additionally, prison officials routinely subject youths and
individuals with mental disabilities to solitary confinement for
prolonged periods despite their known vulnerabilities — a practice that, according to the IACHR, runs contrary to international
human rights standards.8 A fifteen-year-old prisoner placed in
solitary confinement for three months described how she hurt
herself to deal with the pain and loss she experienced while
alone with her thoughts:

* Jacob Zoghlin is a J.D. candidate at the American University
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I became a cutter [in solitary confinement]. I like to
take staples and carve letters and stuff in my arm. Each
24
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Even when a hearing is conducted prior to an inmate’s confinement, the prisoner
often faces serious impediments to due process and basic trial rights; no jury
considers the basis for the charge or infraction alleged against the prisoner.
culture and outright threats of violence often discourage prisoners from calling witnesses or putting on any sincere defense to
the administrative charges against them.

letter means something to me. It is something I had
lost. Like the first one was a [letter], which is the first
letter in my mother’s name. And every day I would
apologize to her. I don’t know — I felt like I had a burden I couldn’t carry and it made me feel good.9

The prison administrator’s decision is subject to minimal
oversight, which makes it extremely difficult for prisoners to
challenge their placement in solitary confinement.17 Because the
standard for proving guilt in administrative hearings is particularly low — requiring only a preponderance of the evidence —
alleged violations of prison rules routinely result in findings of
guilt based on little more evidence than the testimony of a single
prison guard.18 In a Florida facility, a prison guard reportedly
punished an entire group of inmates with solitary confinement
for a noise violation because he could not determine who was
responsible.19 This represents what many human rights organizations decry as an overuse of punitive solitary confinement
– using extreme isolation as a disciplinary tool of first-resort
for minor infractions, without regard for the long-term harmful
implications that such isolation can have on prisoners.

Far from an extraordinary case, this experience expresses
common reactions of inmates placed in solitary confinement.10
Medical studies have confirmed that nearly half of all prisoners
in solitary confinement develop serious mental and psychological problems, like the self-inflicted harm described above,
or have existing medical and psychological problems exacerbated.11 Bob Peoples, who spent over two years in isolation for
allegedly filing false legal documents, stated, “life in the box
stripped me of my dignity, and made me feel like a chained
dog.”12 Solitary confinement goes too far and is used too often.
It is not just harsh, it is degrading and damaging.

What Is Required Before A Prisoner is Placed
in the Hole?

Most assume that punitive isolation practices, with their
damaging physical, emotional, and social consequences, are
only used in the gravest circumstances against the most violent
offenders who pose a risk to others. That simply is not the case.
Although prison officials can generally choose from a range
of penalties, they often use solitary confinement in lieu of less
severe measures. One adolescent, who had been in prison since
the age of fifteen, reported that officials responded to almost
every infraction with punitive solitary confinement:

In the United States, solitary confinement primarily is used
for three reasons: “to punish violations of prison rules (disciplinary segregation); to isolate prisoners who pose a threat to the
safety and security of the prison (administrative segregation);
and to shield vulnerable prisoners, such as those potentially
targeted for violence in the general prison population (protective
custody).”13
U.S. prisons commonly use solitary confinement to punish
a variety of minor, non-violent offenses, such as failure to keep
a tidy cell, wasting food, or littering.14 Disciplinary solitary
confinement for these types of minor offenses is not a sentence
imposed after a separate jury trial before an impartial judge;
rather, it is an administrative punishment imposed with limited
oversight against already incarcerated individuals.15 Although
the law entitles inmates to receive notice of the charges and
an administrative hearing before being placed in punitive solitary confinement, these procedural safeguards are not always
observed.16 Even when a hearing is conducted prior to an
inmate’s confinement, the prisoner often faces serious impediments to due process and basic trial rights; no jury considers the
basis for the charge or infraction alleged against the prisoner.

15 days for not making the bed; 15 days for not keeping
the cell door open; 20 or 25 days for being in someone
else’s cell. In the write-up book, they could have suspended privileges or anything. All they did is disciplinary seg[regation]. I would put my ear wax in the toilet
in my cell and flush it to watch it spin. I did [solitary
confinement] time for that. 20
Recent reports from the New York Civil Liberty Union
(NYCLU) discuss the use of solitary confinement in New York
prisons.
[F]rom 2007 to 2011, the Department of Corrections
issued more than 68,000 solitary confinement sentences for various rule infractions. Of those 68,000
sentences, only 16 percent were for assault or weapons
offenses. For example, between 2007 and 2011, the
DOC issued 302 isolation sentences for “smoking in
an undesignated area,” 135 for “wasting food,” 114
for “littering,” and 234 for keeping an “untidy cell or
person.”21

Additionally, prisoners do not have access to a lawyer at any
point during these hearings. Although inmates may call witnesses to rebut the charges against them, the realities of prison
life and the evidentiary rules imposed at these hearings make
calling witnesses a practical impossibility. For example, in order
to call a fellow inmate as a potential witness, a prisoner must
often know the first and last name of the fellow inmate, as well
as the prisoner’s inmate number, which is information that is
not normally available to prison inmates. Furthermore, prison
25
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housed with the general population.33 The extreme and excessive
use of solitary confinement in the U.S. contradicts international
human rights standards that protect children.34

Effects of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement deprives individuals of the basic need
for human interaction, including family ties, and can increase
the rate of recidivism among prisoners and released inmates.22
Several studies have concluded that visitation can reduce and
delay recidivism, attributing that result to the positive effects
of social interaction.23 These studies demonstrate that solitary
confinement undermines the penological goal of rehabilitation
and has significant negative psychological effects.

Children and Solitary Confinement
International human rights derive their standards from fundamental human needs.35 The Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), and the United Nations Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) all prohibit torture and other forms of cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatments or punishments that undermine both shared humanity and basic human needs. In recognition of these treaties, and the rights they protect, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee
stated, “prolonged solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned
person may amount to [torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment].”36 Special
Rapporteur Méndez, in his official
report as the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture, concluded that the “physical conditions” and “regime of solitary confinement” can amount to
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or torture.37 Méndez stressed
that solitary confinement should be
limited and should always be accompanied by procedural safeguards.

Dr. Stuart Grassia, one of the first American psychiatrists
to study the effects of extreme isolation, found that prisoners
placed in prolonged solitary confinement often develop a medical condition known as Reduced Environmental Stimulation
(RES),24 which mirrors the symptoms exhibited by hostages
and prisoners of war.25 Senator John
McCain, who was subjected to solitary confinement as a prisoner of
war in Vietnam, wrote that solitary
confinement “crushes your spirit and
weakens your resistance more effectively than any other form of mistreatment.”26 Testimonials like this,
as well as medical data compiled by
numerous experts, indicate that “[s]
ocial interaction is neither a right
nor a privilege — it is a fundamental
human need.”27 Dr. Atul Gawande
noted that, “simply to exist as a
normal human being requires interaction with other people.”28 Prolonged
solitary confinement results in drastic physiological changes that can cause severe physical and
psychological harm. Accordingly, the harmful physical and
psychological effects of prolonged punitive solitary confinement
run contrary to prisoners’ basic human rights, which entitle all
people to dignity and bodily integrity.

Senator John McCain, who
was subjected to solitary
confinement as a prisoner of war
in Vietnam, wrote that solitary
confinement “crushes your spirit
and weakens your resistance
more effectively than any other
form of mistreatment.”

Psychologically, solitary confinement may cause many
severe conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
panic attacks, flashbacks, chronic hyper-vigilance, hopelessness, problems with impulse control including random violence
and self-harm, overt paranoia, intrusive and obsessive thoughts,
difficulties with concentration and memory, perceptual distortions, and hypersensitivity to external stimuli.29 Physiologically,
solitary confinement can cause sleep disturbances, headaches,
lethargy, dizziness, heart palpitations, appetite loss, weight loss,
severe digestive problems, diaphoresis, back and joint pain,
deterioration of eyesight, shaking and feeling cold, and aggravation of pre-existing medical problems.30

Similarly, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has held that “solitary confinement or unnecessary restrictions to visitation regimens constitute a violation to the right to humane treatment.”38 Because
of the severe mental and physiological effects of extreme isolation, international and regional bodies have consistently found
that solitary confinement should only be used under exceptional circumstances and not as a punishment of first-resort.
The IACtHR has repeatedly held that the conditions of solitary
confinement violate international prohibitions against torture.39
Similarly, the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) recognizes the severe mental and physical damage caused by solitary
confinement and limits its use.40 For these reasons, the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Basic Principles
for the Treatment of Prisoners has made clear that “[e]fforts
addressed to the abolition of solitary confinement as a punishment, or to the restriction of its use, should be undertaken and
encouraged.”41

Moreover, prison administrators who lack expertise in
medicine or psychology cannot anticipate or judge the damage
caused by placing vulnerable individuals in solitary confinement.31 Because many states hold juveniles in adult facilities
and impose adult punishments like solitary confinement, advocates often raise concerns about the severe effects of isolation on
juveniles due to their youth and developing brains.32 Because of
these underdevelopments and age-related vulnerabilities, juveniles are nineteen times more likely to kill themselves in solitary
confinement than they are to kill themselves when they are

Additionally, with respect to juvenile inmates, there is an
even stronger argument against solitary confinement because
it deprives youth of basic human needs, like opportunities for
social, physical, educational, and spiritual development, which
violates the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). This convention “recogniz[es] the right of
every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development” as a
fundamental human right.42 International human rights organizations that condemn placing children in solitary confinement
26
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because of fears that extreme isolation denies basic needs, as
well as concerns that solitary confinement is more harmful and
disproportionate when used to punish youths.43

avoid potential constitutional violations that arise when severe,
damaging punishments are used to discipline minor, nonviolent
offenses.46

International Standards and Solitary Confinement

Domestic Laws Affecting Solitary Confinement
In The U.S.

The international community has clearly recognized the
importance of placing restrictions on solitary confinement to
ensure that it is not used in an arbitrary and excessive manner. In
the case of Babar Ahmad v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR recognized that, “in order to avoid any risk of arbitrariness resulting
from a decision to place a prisoner in solitary confinement, the
decision must be accompanied by procedural safeguards guaranteeing the prisoner’s welfare and the
proportionality of the measure.”44
The ECtHR’s decision limits on the
use of solitary confinement in four
ways. First, the decision to impose
solitary confinement as a punishment must be based on genuine
grounds and should only be used
in exceptional circumstances, as a
measure of last resort, following
procedural precautions. Second,
authorities must consider a prisoner’s circumstances, situation, and
behavior when assigning solitary
confinement as a punishment, documenting the substantive reasons
for their decision in order to demonstrate that the disciplinary solitary confinement is proportional
to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the particular
inmate. Third, prisons must monitor the physical and mental
condition of inmates in order to ensure that solitary confinement
remains appropriate. Finally, prisoners must have an opportunity
to challenge their placement in prolonged solitary confinement
before an independent judicial authority.

Why Children Are Different
Consistent with international treaties, the U.S. Supreme
Court has unequivocally stated that children are not to be treated
as having the same culpability as adults and has required courts
to consider juveniles’ youthfulness in determining the proportionality, and therefore the constitutionality, of children’s punishments
under the Eighth Amendment.47
The Supreme Court bases its distinction between juveniles and
adults on three distinguishing factors between the two groups. First,
children have a “‘lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless
risk-taking.” Second, “children ‘are
more vulnerable . . . to negative
influences and outside pressures,’
including from their family and
peers; they have limited ‘contro[l]
over their own environment’ and
lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Third, “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’
as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely
to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”

the ECtHR recognized that,
“in order to avoid any risk of
arbitrariness resulting from a
decision to place a prisoner
in solitary confinement, the
decision must be accompanied by
procedural safeguards guaranteeing
the prisoner’s welfare and the
proportionality of the measure.”

Because of these three factors, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the traditional penological interests that
usually justify harsh punishments are diminished when applied
to juveniles.48 The same diminished penological interests that
render capitol punishment illegal should also render solitary
confinement illegal. Both are inappropriate as a form of retribution and are less likely to deter recidivism. Moreover, studies
have shown that solitary confinement actually increases rates
of recidivism and therefore cannot be justified by a penological
interest in rehabilitation.49

These standards ensure that the imposition of solitary confinement is proportional and comports with international human
rights standards. Although the ECtHR did not find a violation in
the aforementioned case, its discussion of solitary confinement
is useful in understanding what restrictions must be in place to
protect the human rights of prisoners. To implement these standards, countries need to impose strict regulations to eliminate
the use of disciplinary solitary confinement or at least limit its
use to punishment of only serious, violent offenses.

Federal Constitutional Issues Affecting Solitary
Confinement

Similarly, the IACtHR has limited the use of solitary confinement, holding that “isolation from the outside world produces in
any person moral suffering and psychic perturbations, places
them in a situation of particular vulnerability, and increases the
risk of aggression and arbitrariness in prisons.”45 This further
supports the requirement that such harsh punishments only be
used in enumerated circumstances for serious, violent offenses
to avoid arbitrary enforcement that is disproportionate to the
underlying offense. These international standards of proportionality are in place to protect the human rights and dignity
of prisoners and should be adopted throughout the U.S. to

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.50 Although
the scope of that prohibition is not always clear, the Eighth
Amendment undisputedly prohibits torture. In Weems v. United
States, Justice McKenna explained that, “the inhibition [against
cruel and unusual punishment] was directed not only against
punishments which inflict torture, ‘but against all punishments
which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.’”51 Accordingly, the notion
that the punishment should be proportional to the crime has
27
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become fundamental to interpreting the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court bases this proportionality requirement on
the following two separate but related principles: (1) sentencing
practices with a significant disparity between the culpability of
the offenders and the severity of the penalty are prohibited,52 and
(2) courts must consider the “specific character of a defendant.” 53

to forbid the use of certain severe punishments, like the death
penalty, against particularly vulnerable populations, like juveniles56 and individuals with mental disabilities.57 Because proportionality cannot exist in a vacuum, the Eighth Amendment
requires that punishments be appropriate to both the nature of
the specific crime and the character of the particular individual.

The first principle of the proportionality requirement judges
what is fair and proportionate from a macro level; it provides
that extreme punishments may only be used to punish serious, blameworthy offenses. From this perspective, the Eighth
Amendment operates to constrain when and how the government may use force to enforce laws. For example, in Solem v.
Helm, the Court invalidated a severe sentence using the Eighth
Amendment’s proportionality analysis.54 The Court reasoned
that the punishment of life without the possibility of parole
was grossly disproportionate to the minor, nonviolent crime
that involved only $100, holding that the sentence constituted
a cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth
Amendment.

Just as judges must consider a defendant’s youth and mental
fitness when issuing a sentence, prison administrators must
consider each prisoner’s individual characteristics before placing them in solitary confinement. Stringent standards that (1)
restrict who may be placed in solitary confinement, (2) limit the
duration of solitary confinement, and (3) require prison administrators to consider the characteristics of prisoners before placing
them in solitary confinement, would reduce the constitutional
concerns that arise when isolation is used as a “one size fits all”
punishment. Such standards would authorize solitary confinement only on a case-by-case basis and only when penological
interests (such as protecting the remainder of the prison population) justify its use.

Just as the culpability of a nonviolent, $100 crime does not
justify life without parole, the culpability of a minor, nonviolent
offense like wasting food does not justify the severe punishment
of solitary confinement, which causes lasting physical and psychological harm. In both instances, the culpability of the crime
does not warrant the deprivation of liberty imposed by the punishment. Only interests in the health and safety of the prisoners
and guards – and not minor disciplinary concerns – can proportionally justify the use of solitary confinement. Only grave and
violent infractions can constitutionally warrant such serious and
potentially harmful punishments. Given the systematic over use
of solitary confinement, stricter standards must be implemented
to alleviate the constitutional infirmities associated with the
disproportionate and excessive punishment for minor offenses.

What Makes a Punishment Proportional?
The proportionality analysis draws its meaning from the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” The “evolving standards of decency” standard
is used to determine whether the disparity between the severity
of a punishment and the culpability of a crime renders a particular penological practice so disproportionate that it violates
the Eighth Amendment. Courts consider three factors under
this standard: (1) the practices of other civilized nations, (2) the
status of state laws on the particular issue, and (3) the direction
of changes in state laws.58
Accordingly, international standards disfavoring solitary
confinement suggest that standards of decency have evolved
away from the use of solitary confinement and, at the very least,
require strict regulations limiting the use of disciplinary solitary
confinement to punishing the most heinous, violent offenses.
These international standards require implementing procedures
that avoid arbitrariness and promote the proportional use of
solitary confinement. The effect of these evolving standards of
decency on U.S. law is to raise the bar for what is considered
proportional when it comes to the imposition of punitive solitary confinement. Therefore, as the use of solitary confinement
becomes increasingly taboo by international standards, the indiscriminate use of solitary confinement by prison administrators
becomes increasingly disproportional.

The second principle of proportionality looks at what is fair
on the micro level and is based on the understanding that a punishment for a particular crime, which ordinarily may be appropriate, can be grossly disproportionate when applied to certain
defendants, like youths or individuals with mental disabilities,
whose circumstances mitigate their culpability.55 The mandate
that an individual’s circumstances be considered when determining whether a punishment is proportional has led the Court

In determining whether a legal punishment is proportional to
the crime, courts consider whether the statute, rule, or regulation
that permits the punishment is devoid of standards that establish
when that punishment may be imposed. In County of Nassau
v. Canavan, for example, the court held that the fact that the
statute was “devoid of standards as to which petty offenses . . .
[would] result in the implementation of the forfeiture provisions
. . . enhanc[ed] the opportunity for disproportionate enforcement. Indeed, the County’s unilateral decision to invoke the ordinance’s nearly limitless application in certain instances and not
in others highlights the infirmity inherent in the statute itself.”59
Although this case challenged a law based on the excessive fines
clause, it highlights the legal problem associated with the lack

Inside Supermax – Something Burning, photo couresy of Flikr user
Ryan Lobo
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constitutional violations consistently result.66 This concern is
magnified when juveniles are subjected to solitary confinement because youth are generally considered less culpable than
adults,67 and solitary confinement has a substantially greater
deleterious effect on them.68 Rather when determining whether
the conditions of solitary confinement are proportional, courts
should give as much consideration to medical experts, who can
put the harmful effects of solitary confinement into perspective,
as they do to prison administrators, who understand the penal
interests involved.

of cognizable standards for when solitary confinement may be
used and for how long it may be used. A lack of standards about
when severe punishments may be used unreasonably risks disproportionate and arbitrary enforcement by permitting extreme
measures to be used to discipline minor and technical violations
that do not warrant such punishments. The lack of standards
creates a per se challenge to a presumption of proportionality.
Indeed, a Texas court found, in Morales v. Turman, that
“[p]lacing inmates in solitary confinement or secured facilities,
in the absence of any legislative or administrative limitation on
the duration and intensity of the confinement and subject only
to the unfettered discretion of correctional officers, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.”60 The court prohibited solitary confinement unless it
is “clearly necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to
the inmate or to other persons or clearly necessary to prevent
imminent and substantial destruction of property.”61 This decision affirms that, because solitary confinement is severe, its use
is unconstitutionally disproportionate when not constrained by
standards, time limits, and procedural safeguards.

Although some offenses justify severe punishments under
the proportionality analysis, other offenses are so minor that the
imposition of one of the harshest punishments is unacceptable.
Not only is solitary confinement among the severest punishments in the U.S., it is also one of the least regulated and most
arbitrarily employed punishments. The lack of standards creates
a constitutional infirmity by permitting prison administrators
to impose solitary confinement as a punishment with almost
no judicial oversight or due process consideration. The extreme
harm of solitary confinement raises severe proportionality
concerns. Even if solitary confinement is justified and used
proportionally when keeping general prison populations safe
from violent inmates, it still is cruel, unusual, and grossly disproportionate when used against nonviolent inmates for minor
offenses.

From this perspective, when no legislative or administrative
rule limits what infractions warrant the imposition of extreme
isolation, the standard violates the proportionality requirement.
Additionally, such loose standards risk running afoul of the Due
Process Clause by allowing prison administrators to impose
solitary confinement arbitrarily without first affording prisoners
a genuine opportunity to challenge their punishment before an
independent, judiciary authority.

Stricter standards for when solitary confinement may be
imposed would help prevent solitary confinement from being
used disproportionately and could also protect prisoners’ due
process rights. The U.S. ought to establish federal rules for
when solitary confinement may be used that comport with international and regional standards. Such standards must consider
the objective medical fact that solitary confinement drastically
changes prisoners’ physiology and causes severe physical and
psychological harm. These standards would recognize that the
proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment mandates
that solitary confinement be used exceedingly sparingly.

Addressing The Problems With Solitary Confinement
In The U.S.
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed that “[c]onfinement in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards,”62 courts have
failed to apply that scrutiny effectively to constrain its continued use, deciding instead to defer to the judgment of prison
administrators.63 Even though courts must necessarily consider
proportionality and human dignity in deciding cases challenging
prison conditions, because of the presumed expert knowledge of
prison administrators, courts have largely deferred to the judgments of prison administrators “in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”64 This is because, in considering the legality of prison
conditions, courts try to strike a balance between scrutinizing
the challenged conditions and considering the difficult realities
of prison administration. Ultimately, however, courts defer to the
judgment of prison administrators too much.65

By permitting solitary confinement to be used only for
protective purposes, and not for disciplinary reasons, penal
institutions could reduce arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of solitary confinement. Stricter standards foster greater
proportionality of punishments for infractions. Standards would
prevent solitary confinement from being used as a punishment
of first-resort for minor infractions. Finally, because solitary
confinement does not serve penological interests such as reducing recidivism, as discussed above, limiting its use does not
undermine prison’s administrators capacity to control the prison
population.

Conclusion

Prison administrators are not in a position to weigh the
penological interests against the inevitable physical, social, and
psychological damages associated with solitary confinement
because they do not realize the harm that this treatment causes.
Furthermore, because prison administrators are not health
experts, they are ill equipped to determine whether a penalty
that helps maintain discipline (such as solitary confinement)
is proportionate to the violation it punishes. Thus, when prison
guards are given such discretion in deciding when to impose
solitary confinement, disproportionate punishments constituting

At the very least, solitary confinement is overused. That is
something that can be agreed upon and something that can be
fixed. Establishing strict standards for when solitary confinement may be used and, more importantly, when it may not be
used can prevent the most brazen abuses. The government can
and should limit its duration, end its utilization as a punitive
measure, and forbid its use against youths and individuals with
mental disabilities – the government has a legal obligation to
do so under both international law and the U.S. Constitution.
29
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Without limited, enumerated standards for when a prisoner
may receive solitary confinement, the imposition of this severe

punishment as a disciplinary measure risks arbitrary and disproportionate use, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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